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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROYAL STREET LAND COMPANY, 
A Utah corporation, 
Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 19480 
WILLIAM J. REED and 
PATSY REED, 
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by appellant Royal Street Land 
Company ("Royal Street") pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 78-40-1 to -13 (1977) to quiet title to the surface rights 
in a certain parcel of land located on Deer Valley Road in 
Park City, Utah. R. 1-2. Respondents William J. Reed and 
Patsy Reed (the "Reeds") answered claiming title to the prop-
erty by adverse possession under Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-7 to 
-15 (1977) and asserting that, in any event, Royal Street's 
action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-5 (1977). "R. 19-20. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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I 
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson granted summary judgment in 
favor of the Reeds and, on September 12, 1983, signed a judg-
 { 
ment quieting title in the Reeds to the surface rights in the 
property, R. 358-59. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
On appeal, the Reeds seek to affirm the summary judgment 
entered by the district court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action involves a rectangular parcel of land encom-
passing approximately two-thirds of an acre on Deer Valley 
Road in Park City, Utah. The property is located in a resi-
dential area on one of the many patented mining claims in 
Park City. A home, built in the 1920s, is situated on 
approximately the center of the property, and a double garage 
is located on a rear corner. The home is surrounded by a 
lawn and by various shrubs, bushes and gardens, all of which 
the Reeds maintain. The Reeds have expended years of per-
sonal effort and substantial sums of money on improving and 
caring for the home and surrounding property. R. 106-111. 
In contrast, Royal Street and its predecessors have had such 
remote contact with the property that, for over fifty years, 
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they remained unaware that a house had been built and that 
the property was being used as a residence. R. 27. 
This is an appeal from summary judgment, so the facts as 
reflected in the district court record are crucial. The 
issue on appeal is a narrow one: whether Royal Street's (and 
its predecessors') payment of the $5.00 per acre tax imposed 
by Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-57 (1973) on "mines and mining 
claims" prevents the Reeds from acquiring title to the sur-
face estate by adverse possession. The Reeds dispute Royal 
Street's statement of facts to the extent it implicitly 
raises factual questions which were undisputed in the court 
below. Thus, the Reeds present the following account of the 
undisputed facts to demonstrate the narrowness of the issue 
around which the case revolves. 
It was undisputed in the district court that Royal Street 
holds the record title to the surface of the property, but 
that the Reeds and their predecessors have been in exclusive, 
open, notorious and continuous possession of the surface 
estate and its improvements for over fifty years. In addi-
tion, it was undisputed that the Reeds have paid all taxes 
being assessed against the property or its improvements of 
which they were aware, and that they have met all of the 
other statutory requirements for adverse possession. They 
-3-
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entered possession under claim of title founded upon a writ-
ten instrument, have been in continuous, open and notorious 
possession since that time, either in person or through 
lessees, and have cultivated and improved the property, which 
has been substantially enclosed. See Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 78-12-7 to -14 (1977). Certainly, 50 years of residential 
use could not have been mistaken for an occasional trespass, 
and Royal Street has disputed neither the conclusion nor the 
facts supporting the conclusion that those statutory require-
ments have been met. 
Royal Street's record title to the surface estate origi-
nates in mining patents issued by the United States. The 
property is part of 40 acres to which Royal Street has 
received record title following various conveyances stemming 
from the patents to the mining claims. Record title to the 
underlying mineral rights is owned by United Park City Mines 
Company, Royal Street's predecessor. 
The Reeds' predecessors first occupied the property in 
the 1920s. In 1928 or 1929, William Lawry, a shift boss for 
Park Utah Consolidated Mine Company, built a house and double 
garage which are still located on the property, and which 
serve as the Reeds' residence. R. 155. Mr. Lawry built 
fences on the east and west boundaries of the property, 
extending from a roadway on the south to a railroad track 
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near and parallelling the present road on the north side of 
the property. The west side fence was later replaced with 
railroad ties. Those railroad ties, along with the east 
fence line and the north and south roadways, still exist on 
the property today. R. 155. 
In 1946, Mr. Lawry and his wife quitclaimed the house and 
other improvements on the property to Ray Pedersen. R. 161. 
Mr. Pedersen died in 1954. R. 158. After his death, his 
wife Edythe, in order to establish ownership rights to the 
house and improvements, paid past due taxes at a tax sale and 
received title by quitclaim deed from Summit County in 1955. 
R. 158-162. In order to further establish her rights to the 
house and the property surrounding the house, Mrs. Pedersen 
executed and recorded a document entitled "Declaration of 
Homestead" dated November 2, 1956. R. 158, 163-64. Until 
she quitclaimed the property to the Reeds, she claimed the 
exclusive right to possession of the property and intended to 
exclude all others from any interest in the property except 
with her permission. R. 159-160. 
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In August, 1962, Mrs. Pedersen (then named Rasband) sold 
the land and improvements thereon to the Reeds. R. 165. 
The quitclaim deed from Mrs. Rasband under which the Reeds 
came into possession described the property conveyed as: 
House No. 570, with double garage, being the ninth 
(9th) house on the rear, South side of Deer Valley, 
Park City, Utah, including all land surrounding the 
house between the lateral fence lines and extending 
from the road in front to the road in rear. 
R. 107, 113. Since obtaining the property from Mrs. Rasband, 
the Reeds have continuously occupied and maintained the prop-
erty as their principal residence, except for periods from 
1967 to 1973 and from 1978 to 1979, when they leased the 
house to tenants who occupied the property. R. 109. The 
Reeds have expended over $20,000 on improvements to the house 
and the property, including landscaping, gardening, extensive 
remodeling of the house, addition of 60 to 70 feet of cement 
lln its brief, Royal Street alleges that the Reeds gave 
only nominal consideration for the property. Appellant's 
Brief pp. 15-16. That allegation was not raised in the lower 
court, so the record contains no contrary evidence. Never-
theless, the court may be assured that the Reeds paid a sub-
stantial sum for the property in 1962. The quitclaim deed's 
recital of $10 consideration, R. 113, merely reflects the 
uniform practice of stating only nominal consideration in 
deeds. The court may take note that Royal Street's deed to 
the property also recites only nominal consideration. 
R. 224-27. 
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sidewalk on the property and replacement of water lines on 
the property. R. 57-58f 110-111. 
In 1973, the Reeds quitclaimed the property to themselves 
in order to establish a metes and bounds legal description of 
the property. R. 108. While the legal description was later 
found to be erroneous, the 1973 quitclaim deed incorporated 
by reference the terms of the 1962 deed from Mrs. Rasband and 
the 1956 Declaration of Homestead. R. 114-16. The Reeds1 
possession and right to possession of the property remained 
undisputed until October 23, 1979, when this suit was filed, 
and they have always considered themselves to be the rightful 
owners of the property. R. 108-110. 
The only dispute in this case is whether the Reeds have 
legally satisfied the requirement under Utah law that claim-
ants to title by adverse possession pay the taxes assessed on 
the property during the adverse possession period. Since 
they entered into possession of the property in 1962, the 
Reeds have paid all taxes assessed against the property or 
its improvements of which they were aware. Prior to 1973, 
the Reeds and their predecessors paid taxes on the property 
described as "9th House S Side Deer Valley PC House #570 with 
double garage." R. 110. In 1973, following the Reeds1 con-
veyance of the property to themselves under a metes and 
bounds legal description, the tax notices were changed to 
-7-
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describe the property by the metes and bounds description. 
The Reeds have paid taxes on that description from 1973 to 
the present. R. 111. In fact, Royal Street commenced its 
quiet title action against the Reeds approximately one week 
prior to the tax assessment date for the seventh year of 
taxes under that description. R. 4f 63. 
The only tax involving the property that the Reeds have 
not paid is the mining claim tax set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-5-57 (1973). That tax is levied on the mine or mining 
claim at the rate of $5.00 per acre, plus an adjustment based 
on gross revenues, if any. From 1939 to 1977, that tax was 
levied on the forty acre tract of mining claims now owned by 
Royal Street and United Park City Mines Company, which 
includes the 2/3 acre occupied and claimed by the Reeds, and 
was assessed to Royal Street or its predecessors in inter-
est. In 1977 or 1978, because of the separation of record 
title to the surface and mineral estates in those forty acres 
occasioned by the 1975 conveyance, the State Tax Commission 
referred the surface rights in the mining claims to Summit 
County for separate assessment. In 1980, after this action 
was commenced, Summit County separately assessed the surface 
rights in the forty acre tract to Royal Street for 1980 and 
for 1977 through 1979 in arrears." R. 76. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
It is the Reeds1 position that, under controlling Utah 
case lawf they acquired ownership of the surface rights in 
the property prior to 1973 by virtue of their satisfaction of 
the statutory requirements for adverse possession and in 
spite of the payment of the $5.00 per acre tax on the mining 
claims by Royal Street and its predecessors. When the sur-
face of a mining claim is unimproved, the mining claim tax 
may well include surface rights. As soon as the surface is 
used for non-mining purposes, however, Utah law requires 
separate assessment of the surface and mineral estates, and 
applies the mining claim tax only to the underlying mineral 
rights. 
In the case at bar, non-mining use of the surface began 
in the 1920s when Mr. Lawry moved onto the property, con-
structed a house and occupied it as a residence. Under Utah 
law, adverse possessors must pay all taxes assessed against 
the interest they claim. In the case at bar, the Reeds claim 
only the surface rights to the property and make no claim to 
the underlying mieral estate. Because the required separate 
assessment of the surface rights was not made until 1980, no 
tax was lawfully assessed against-the surface for over fifty 
years and the Reeds acquired ownership of the surface by 
-9-
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adverse possession. In addition, the Reeds assert that Royal 
Street's action is barred by the statute of limitations. 
POINT I < 
PRIOR TO 197 3, NO TAXES WERE LAWFULLY 
ASSESSED AGAINST THE SURFACE ESTATE OF THE 
PROPERTY AND THE REEDS ARE THEREFORE 
ENTITLED TO OWNERSHIP THROUGH ADVERSE 
POSSESSION WITHOUT PAYMENT OF TAXES. < 
A. Where No Taxes Are Legally Assessed, Title Can Be 
Acquired Through Adverse Possession Without Payment 
of Taxes. 
In order to establish title by adverse possession, Utah 
law requires that, during the seven years of continuous pos-
session relied upon for adverse possession, the possessing 
party "must have paid all taxes which have been levied and 
assessed upon such land according to law." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-12-12 (1977). The law in Utah is well settled, however, 
that where rvo taxes are lawfully assessed, title by adverse 
possession may be acquired without payment of taxes. Farrer 
v. Johnson, 2 Utah 2d 189, 271 P.2d 462, 466 (1954). As will 
be shown below, the $5.00 mining claim tax paid by Royal 
Street could not lawfully include the surface rights to the 
property after non-mining use of the surface began in the 
1920s. Therefore, because the Reeds have paid all taxes law-
fully assessed on the surface, they are entitled to ownership 
by adverse possession. 
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B#
 The Collateral Issues Royal Street Raises Involving 
the Assessment of the Taxes Paid by the Reeds Are 
Irrelevant. 
In its brief, Royal Street raises the issues of whether 
the assessment under which the Reeds paid taxes prior to 1973 
included the surface or only the improvements on the surface 
of the property, and of whether, beginning in 1973, the 
assessment of taxes under an erroneous legal description 
operated to invalidate those taxes. Appellant's Brief pp. 
6-7, 14, 17-18, 39-40. Royal Street's assertion is that, 
because of those alleged defects, the taxes so assessed were 
not assessed against the realty in issue and that therefore, 
the Reeds paid no taxes on the property. Based on that 
assertion, Royal Street concludes that the Reeds did not 
satisfy the payment of taxes requirement of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-12-12 (1977). 
Royal Street's focus is misplaced in two respects. 
First, while the erroneous property description contained in 
the post-1973 tax notices may raise a question concerning the 
lawfulness of the taxes so assessed, resolution of that ques-
tion has no impact on the outcome of this case. It is undis-
puted that no other tax, except the mining claim tax, was 
assessed involving the property, and that the Reeds therefore 
paid all taxes lawfully assessed.- In addition, it is not 
disputed that the Reeds paid the post-1973 taxes for one year 
-11-
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less than the requisite seven years before commencement of 
this action. Finally, it is undisputed that the Reeds began 
paying the pre-1973 taxes in 1962. Because the Reeds paid 
the pre-1973 taxes for over seven years, any rights the Reeds 
have acquired by adverse possession would have been acquired 
before 1973. Therefore, the error in the post-1973 property 
description is not relevant. In any event, the 1973 deed 
also referred to the descriptions in prior conveyances, R. 
114, and the parties stipulated in the district court that 
the legal description was intended to describe the same prop-
erty. R. 347-52. 
Second, Royal Street's assertion that the pre-1973 taxes 
only included improvements on the surface, and its concomi-
tant questioning of whether the Reeds paid any tax on the 
surface rights, is misplaced. The proper focus is on whether 
any taxes were validly assessed on the property which the 
Reeds did not pay, rather than on whether the Reeds paid any 
taxes on the property. It is undisputed that both the pre-
1973 taxes and the post-1973 taxes, valid or not, were paid 
by the Reeds and that no other taxes, except the $5.00 per 
acre mining claim tax, were assessed involving the property 
during the critical period. If the pre- and post-1973 taxes 
were lawfully assessed, the Reeds paid them. If the taxes 
were not lawfully assessed, the Reeds were not required to 
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of any surface use made of mining claims, or mining 
property for other than mining purposes, shall be 
assessed as other tangible property. 
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Utah Const. Art. XIII § 4 (emphasis added). Under the 
Constitution, separate assessment and taxation of the surface 
of the property are required once the surface acquires an 
identity separate from the mining claim. 
Pursuant to the Constitutional requirement, the taxation 
statute first requires assessment of the mine or mining claim 
itself, without reference to the accompanying surface rights: 
All metalliferous mines and mining claims, both 
placer and rock in place, shall be assessed at $5.00 
per acre and in addition thereto at a value equal to 
two times the average net annual proceeds thereof 
for the three calendar years next preceding or for 
as many calendar years next preceding that the mine 
has been operating, whichever is less . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-57 (1973).2 Second, the statute 
requires assessment of mining machinery, surface improvements 
and any non-mining use being made of the surface: 
All machinery used in mining and all property or 
surface improvements upon or appurtenant to mines or 
mining claims and the value of any surface use made 
of mining claims or mining property for other than 
mining purposes shall be assessed at 30% of their 
reasonable fair cash value. 
3 
Id. (emphasis added). 
2A 1981 amendment increased the $5.00 figure to 
$10.00. See Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-57 (Supp. 1983). 
3A 1981 amendment decreased the 30% figure to 20%. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-57 (Supp. 1983). 
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The statutory language is not permissive; rather, it 
requires that non-mining use of the surface be separately 
assessed, and thus demonstrates that the $5.00 per acre tax 
was intended only as a minimum tax on dormant mining claims. 
Utah Copper Co. v. Chandler, 45 Utah 85, 142 P. 1119, 1120 
(1914) (discussed in detail below). For purposes of that 
minimum tax, the "mining claim" includes both surface and 
mineral rights only while the surface of the mining claim 
remains unimproved or is used for mining purposes, because, 
until some separate use occurs, the surface has no identity 
separate from the mining claim. As soon as the surface of 
the claim is used for other than mining purposes, however, 
the surface acquires a separate identity, and the statute and 
Constitution require that the surface be separately assessed 
by the State Tax Commission or the appropriate county. At 
that point, the minimum assessment of $5.00 per acre becomes 
applicable only to the mineral rights underlying the prop-
erty. That rule applies regardless of whether the surface is 
occupied by the record owner or someone other than the record 
owner; the character of the use itself is determinative. 
Thus, once a non-mining use of the surface of the claim 
occurs, the question of whether the $5.00 minimum tax on 
unimproved claims was intended to* include the surface rights 
becomes irrelevant. In the case at bar, that event occurred 
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in the 1920s, when William Lawry began using the surface as 
his residence. At that point, the surface acquired an iden-
tity separate and apart from the mining claim, triggering the 
statutory provision requiring separate assessment of the min-
ing claim and the surface use. Because the required separate 
assessment was never made, no tax, other than any tax paid by 
the Reeds or their predecessors, was lawfully imposed on the 
surface during the adverse possession period, and the Reeds 
are entitled to ownership of the surface rights through 
adverse possession without payment of the tax imposed on the 
mining claim. See Farrer v. Johnson, 2 Utah 2d 189, 271 P.2d 
462, 466 (1954) . 
D. Under Controlling Utah Case Law, Royal Street's 
Payment of the $5.00 Minimum Tax on Mining Claims 
Does Not Prevent the Reeds from Obtaining Title by 
Adverse Possession. 
It has been the settled law of Utah for over 70 years 
that a patented mining claim owner's payment of the $5.00 per 
acre minimum tax imposed by Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-57 (1973) 
and its predecessors does not preclude persons who have 
otherwise fulfilled the statutory adverse possession require-
ments from obtaining title to the surface of the claim by 
adverse possession. The landmark Utah case on the subject, 
Utah Copper Co. v. Chandler, 45 Utah 85, 142 P. 1119 (1914), 
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involved controlling facts identical to those presented in 
the case at bar. 
In Chandlery the record owner of a mining claim sought to 
quiet title to the surface of the claim against two defen-
dants who had built a home and a hall on the claim and who 
claimed title by adverse possession. It was agreed that the 
defendants had paid all taxes separately assessed against the 
surface lots they claimed, and that the tax on the mining 
claim assessed at $5.00 per acre in accordance with Utah 
Revised Statutes § 2504 (1898 as amended), a statute essen-
tially identical to Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-57 (1973) , had been 
paid by the plaintiff. Thus, the case turned on the same 
issue as the case at bar: whether, after non-mining use of 
the surface had occurred, payment of the $5.00 per acre mini-
mum tax by the record owner of the mining claim precluded 
acquisition of title by adverse possession. This court, 
reasoning that the statute required separate assessment of 
the mining claim and the surface rights once a non-mining 
surface use had begun, held that the $5.00 tax applied only 
to the mineral rights and that the defendants were therefore 
entitled to ownership of the surface estate by adverse pos-
session. 
Chandler was, as Royal Street asserts, decided on an 
agreed statement of facts, but the agreement did not render 
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unnecessary the court's resolution of the effect of the min-
ing claim tax* The parties agreed (1) that the record owner 
had paid the mining tax, (2) that the claimants had paid all 
other taxes, although there was an issue concerning whether 
those taxes had been validly assessed, and (3) that, if the 
taxes paid by the claimants were valid, the taxes were deemed 
to be cumulative and any legal rights arising out of a double 
assessment of tax were waived. 142 P. at 1119-20. This 
court held in favor of the claimants on alternative grounds: 
(1) If the taxes paid by the claimants were validly assessed, 
they were entitled to ownership of the surface rights by vir-
tue of their payment of those taxes, and (2) if the taxes 
paid by the claimants were not validly assessed, then no 
taxes were validly assessed on the surface rights and the 
claimants were entitled to ownership without payment of 
taxes. 142 P. at 1120. 
This court's conclusion that payment of the mining tax by 
the record owner did not preclude the claimants' right to 
adverse possession was essential to its ruling in Chandler. 
Had the court found payment of the mining tax sufficient to 
overcome the adverse possession claim to the surface rights, 
it could not have held for the claimants, because it was 
agreed that the record owner, and not the claimants, had paid 
the mining tax. 142 P. at 1119. Under the court's first 
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alternative, that the taxes paid by the claimants were law-
fully assessed and paid, the agreed fact statement would have 
the effect of waiving the claim that the mining tax also 
included the surface, because the taxes paid by the claimants 
did in fact purport to include the surface. Thus, under the 
first alternative, the agreement that taxes were not cumula-
tive would have eliminated from consideration the issues sur-
rounding the applicability of the $5.00 tax to the surface of 
the claim. 
Under the court's second alternative, that the taxes were 
invalid, however, the agreement over the cumulative effect of 
double assessments could have no impact, because the surface 
was not otherwise assessed and by definition no double 
assessment could exist. In that framework, the question 
concerning the applicability of the mining tax to the surface 
was squarely presented. Thus, the finding that the mining 
tax does not apply to the surface rights where the surface is 
used for "other than mining purposes" was necessary to the 
court's resolution of the second alternative. The agreed 
statement of facts under which the case was decided cannot 
defeat that conclusion. 
One year after Chandler, in Utah Copper Co. v. Eckman, 47 
Utah 165, 152 P. 178 (1915), this* court reaffirmed the 
Chandler holding: 
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Under the [taxation] statute, if a person is in 
actual and adverse possession of the surface ground 
of a mining claim for the period of time required by 
our statute, and has, during that time, improved the 
surface under a claim of right, such person may be 
assessed with such surface area and the improvements 
thereon, and . . . may pay the taxes so assessed, 
and such payment will be sufficient to entitle him 
to make a claim of adverse possession to such sur-
face ground, together with the improvements thereon, 
as against the owner of the mining claim, although 
the latter may also have paid the taxes on the min-
ing claim as such and in accordance with the fixed 
statutory evaluation aforesaid, and may claim all 
the minerals beneath the surface. 
152 P. at 180. Eckman involved facts essentially the same as 
Chandler, but this court found the record to be inadequate to 
determine whether the record owner had been assessed only the 
$5.00 per acre minimum tax, or whether it had also been 
assessed separately for surface improvements. If the record 
owner had also been assessed separately for surface improve-
ments, a double assessment would exist and Chandler would not 
apply. Thus, the court remanded the case for further factual 
findings. In the case at bar, however, it is undisputed that 
Royal Street was assessed only the minimum tax, and was 
assessed no separate tax upon the surface use or improvements 
until after this action was commmenced. 
Whether the statute requires separate assessment of the 
mineral and surface rights is a legal, not factual, ques-
tion. Chandler and Eckman are dispositive: the Reeds are 
entitled to ownership by adverse possession despite Royal 
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Street's payment of the $5.00 per acre mining claim tax. To 
hold otherwise would require that both Chandler and Eckman be 
overruled. 
E. The Cases Royal Street Cites to Distinguish Chandler 
and Eckman are Inapplicable. 
Royal Street cites several cases in an attempt to explain 
away Chandler and Eckman. Those cases, however, if applica-
ble at all, are applicable only by analogy, and should not be 
followed in the face of better controlling authority. Royal 
Street cites Aggelos v. Zella Mining Co., 99 Utah 417, 107 
P.2d 170 (1940), for the court's finding therein that 
Chandler and Eckman were not dispositive of that case. 
Appellant's Brief pp. 30-31. It is clear from the case and 
from Royal Street's quotation of the case, however, that the 
court did not reject Chandler and Eckman on their merits. 
Instead, the court held that the question of the effect of 
the mining tax had not been reached because, although Salt 
Lake County had been assessing taxes on the property since 
1927, the claimant had paid those taxes for only four years 
prior to commencement of the action in 1937. 107 P.2d at 
171. The court held that the claimant's purchase of the 
property under a tax deed from the county in 1936 did not 
constitute a payment of taxes, and thus, that the claimant 
had failed to pay the taxes actually assessed against the 
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interest he was claiming for the required seven-year period. 
107 P.2d at 171-72. Thus the court merely held that Chandler 
and Eckman did not fit in the circumstances; the dictum cited 
by Royal Street reflects little if any consideration of those 
cases. It should be noted that in the instant case, the 
Reeds have paid all taxes separately assessed against the 
surface interest they claim. 
Royal Street's citation of Rio Grande W. Ry. v. Salt Lake 
Inv. Co., 35 Utah 528, 101 P. 586 (1909), is similarly inap-
posite. In that case, the railway claimed title by adverse 
possession, asserting that it had listed the land in question 
with the State Board of Equalization, which had exclusive 
statutory authority to tax railway property, and had paid all 
taxes so assessed. The record owner, however, had continued 
to pay taxes assessed on the property by the Salt Lake County 
Assessor. The court held that, because the railway did not 
own the property when it listed it with the Board of 
Equalization, the property was not "railway property" and 
thus the Board had no jurisdiction to tax the property. 
Thus, the only tax "lawfully assessed" on the property was 
that assessed by the county. Because the railway had not 
paid the county tax, the court held that it had not satisfied 
the statutory requirements. 
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Royal Street's analogy of the present case to the Rio 
Grande case is flawed in several respects. First, Rio Grande 
turned on the court's express finding that the property 
involved had not been used for railway purposes, 101 P.2d at 
591, and thus was not subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Board of Equalization, Furthermore, in Rio Grande, a proper 
filing was necessary to trigger a change in taxation; in the 
case at bar, the operation of the statute is automatic. Most 
importantly, however, the outcome of the case at bar hinges 
on whether the statute requires or merely permits separate 
taxation of non-mining surface activities. Thus, the case 
turns on unique statutory language. In asserting, based on 
Rio Grande, that the Reeds' unilateral occupation of the sur-
face could not by itself trigger separate taxation of the 
surface, Royal Street assumes the very conclusions it seeks 
to establish: that the $5.00 minimum tax includes surface 
rights and that the statute does not automatically require 
separate taxation of non-mining uses. 
F. Public Policy Supports the District Court's Grant of 
Title to the Reeds by Adverse Possession. 
"Adverse possession" functions as a method of 
transferring interests in land without the consent 
of the prior owner, and even in spite of the dissent 
of such owner. It rests upon^social judgments that 
there should be a restricted duration for the asser-
tion of "aging claims," and that the elapse of a 
reasonable time should assure security to a person 
claiming to be an owner. 
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R. Powell & P. Rohan, The Law of Real Property 1[ 1012 [2] at 
91-4 (1982). Public policy demands that persons who have 
improved and made beneficial use of a piece of property for 
over 50 years be favored over those whose contact with the 
property was so far removed that they were apparently not 
even aware of the long-time residential use. R. 27. Those 
facts, coupled with Royal Street's use of tenuous analogies 
and sophisticated distinctions to overcome explicitly stated 
rules of longstanding property lawf demonstrate for the court 
the weakness of Royal Street's position. The district 
court's granting of title to the Reeds by adverse possession 
must be upheld. 
POINT II 
ROYAL STREET'S ACTION TO RECOVER POSSESSION 
IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
A. The Express Provisions of the Statute of Limitations 
Bars Royal Street's Action. 
The Reeds have established their title to the property by 
adverse possession under the controlling authorities dis-
cussed above. In additionf however, Royal Street's action to 
challenge the Reeds' title by adverse possession is barred by 
the seven year statute of limitations: 
No action for the recovery of real property or 
for the possession thereof shall be maintained, 
unless it appears that the plaintiff, his ancestor, 
grantor or predecessor was seized or possessed of 
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the property in question within seven years before 
the commencement of the action• 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-5 (1977). In this casef it is undis-
puted that the Reeds and their predecessors were in actual 
possession of the property in question for over 50 years 
prior to commencement of this suit, and that at no time 
during that period was Royal Street in actual possession. 
R. 155-56, 196-98. Under the express provisions of the stat-
ute. Royal Street was not "seized or possessed" of the prop-
erty within the seven year period, and thus is barred from 
asserting title thereto. 
Royal Street argues that, by virtue of its record owner-
ship, it was "seized" of the property within the meaning of 
the statute. In so arguing, Royal Street ignores the fact 
that the Reeds were also "seized" of the property and assumes 
that its constructive seisin can overcome the Reeds1 actual 
seisin. In essence, Royal Street's argument is that the 
statute of limitations cannot operate against record owners 
because record owners are always constructively "seized or 
possessed" of their property. Analysis of the statute of 
limitations in context, however, reveals that it was intended 
to operate against record owners and that adoption of Royal 
Street's interpretation would render meaningless several 
related provisions of the Code. 
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B. Royal Street's Interpretation of the Statute of 
Limitations Would Render Several Other Statutory 
Provisions Superfluous. 
The statute of limitations is part of a broader statutory 
scheme which seeks to protect from attack the interests of 
those who, under some claim of right, have been in continuous 
possession of property over an extended period of time. At 
the same time, the statutory scheme recognizes the special 
interests of record owners, protecting those interests with 
evidentiary presumptions which can only be rebutted upon a 
special showing by the person in possession: 
In every action for the recovery of real prop-
erty, or the possession thereof, the person estab-
lishing a legal title to the property shall be pre-
sumed to have been possessed thereof within the time 
required by law; and the occupation of the property 
by any other person shall be deemed to have been 
under and in subordination to the legal title, 
unless it appears that the property has been held 
and possessed adversely to such legal title for 
seven years before the commencement of the action. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-7 (1977). If Royal Street were 
correct in arguing that the term "seized" in the statute of 
limitations refers to constructive possession, the 
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presumption of possession provided in Section 78-12-7 as a 
4 
protection for record owners would be rendered superfluous. 
C. The Reeds Have Rebutted Royal Streetfs Presumption 
of Possession by Holding the Property "Adversely" 
Within the Meaning of the Statute of Limitations. 
The Legislature, recognizing the applicability of the 
statute of limitations to actions by record owners, required 
the person in possession to rebut the presumption that the 
record owner is in possession with a special showing that the 
property "has been held or possessed adversely to such legal 
title for seven years before the commencement of the 
action." Royal Street argues, based on the phrase "possessed 
adversely" in the statute, that the presumption of possession 
can only be overcome by a showing of title by adverse posses-
sion. In so arguing, Royal Street tacitly admits that the 
statute of limitations operates against record owners. 
4The requirement of the tax title statute of limita-
tions, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-5.1 (1977), that the record 
owner must show actual possession to defeat a tax title, 
should be interpreted as directed at the presumption created 
by the constructive possession statute, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-12-7 (1977), rather than at the broad interpretation of 
the word "seisin" proposed by Royal Street. 
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In any event, the Code does not provide that a showing of 
title by adverse possession is required to overcome the pre-
sumption; rather, it requires a showing that the property has
 { 
been "held and possessed adversely." The Code's specific 
definition of the elements of such a showing conclusively 
refutes Royal Street's assertion that a showing of title by
 t 
adverse possession is required: 
Whenever it appears that the occupant, or those 
under whom he claims, entered into possession of the 
property under claim of title, exclusive of other < 
right, founding such claim upon a written instrument 
as being a conveyance of the property in question, 
or upon the decree or judgment of a competent court, 
and there has been a continued occupation and pos-
session of the property included in such instrument, 
decree or judgment, or of some part of the property
 { 
under such claim, for seven years, the property so 
included is deemed to have been held adversely, 
except that when the property so included consists 
of a tract divided into lots, the possession of one 
lot is not deemed a possession of any other lot of 
the same tract. < 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-8 (1977) (emphasis added). The stat-
ute contains no requirement that taxes be paid. 
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the Reeds \ 
entered into possession under a claim of title founded upon a 
written instrument (the deed from Edythe Rasband). R. 197. 
It is undisputed that the Reeds have continuously occupied < 
the premises under that instrument, either in person or 
through tenants, for substantially in excess of seven years. 
R. 109. It is undisputed that at no time was Royal Street in < 
actual possession. R. 155-56, 196-98. Thus, the property 
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has been "held and possessed adversely" within the meaning of 
the statute, and the Reeds are entitled to judgment dismiss-
ing Royal Street's complaint. 
D. Other Considerations Refute Royal Street's Interpre-
tation of the Statute of Limitations. 
While Royal Street is precluded from asserting its record 
ownership regardless of whether the district court is upheld 
on adverse possession or statute of limitations grounds, the 
two theories are nevertheless not alternative routes to the 
same conclusion. The statute of limitations imposes limited 
requirements and grants a limited remedy, merely shielding 
the instrument under which possession is claimed from 
attack. The adverse possession statute, on the other hand, 
imposes more stringent requirements and grants a broader 
remedy — a new title which forecloses all interests to which 
possession was adverse, including equitable interests. See 
Frederiksen v. LaFleur, 632 P.2d 827, 830 (Utah 1981); 1983 
Utah L. Rev. 256, 259. 
The Reeds' approach avoids the problems of statutory 
interpretation inherent in Royal Street's analysis, and pre-
serves the meaningfulness of the statutes safeguarding the 
special interests of record owners. In addition, it pre-
serves the distinctions between the statutory remedies 
involved. The actual, open and adverse use of the property 
by the Reeds and their predecessors for over 50 years, and 
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the concomitant failure of Royal Street or its predecessors 
to assert any rights to the property during that time, 
require at minimum that this court hold Royal Street's action 
to be barred by the statute of limitations. 
POINT III 
IT IS UNNECESSARY TO REMAND THE CASE TO ' 
ALLOW THE DISTRICT COURT TO ADDRESS THE 
REMAINING ISSUES RAISED BY ROYAL STREET. 
A. The Issue of Whether or Not the Tax Notices Under 
Which the Reeds Paid Taxes Adequately Described the 
Property is Irrelevant. 
Royal Street asserts that "the District Court never 
really confronted the fact that the Reeds have not paid any 
taxes on the property that they actually claimedf" relying 
upon the misdescription of the property contained in the tax 
notices. Appellant's Brief, p. 40. The Reeds, however, 
pointed that issue out to the court in their original brief-
ing of the summary judgment motion, R. 172, and it was raised 
numerous times thereafter. R. 324-25, 329, 332, 347-52. 
Prior to the court's signing its judgment, the parties stipu-
lated and the court ordered that the correct legal descrip-
tion should be substituted for the erroneous description. R. 
347-52. Clearly, the district court was apprised of and con-
sidered the situation. 
< 
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In any event, as pointed out earlier in this brieff the 
issue Royal Street raises is irrelevant. See supra pp. 
11-13. The Reeds paid taxes under the erroneous legal 
description for about one week less than seven years prior to 
filing of this action, and so cannot and do not rely only on 
payment of those taxes for their adverse possession claim. 
In addition, it is conceded that Royal Street paid only the 
$5.00 mining claim tax, and that the only other taxes even 
purporting to involve the property were paid by the Reeds. 
Even if the taxes the Reeds paid were not correctly assessed, 
no other taxes were assessed, and the Reeds were therefore 
not required to pay taxes in order to acquire title by 
adverse possession. Farrer v. Johnson, 2 Utah 2d 189, 271 
P.2d 462 (1954). The validity of the taxes assessed under 
the erroneous property description can have no impact on the 
outcome of this case. 
B. The Purported Dedication of Roadway to Park City Is 
Not Properly Contained in the Record and in Any 
Event Does Not Affect the Outcome. 
Royal Street asserts that the judgment quieting title in 
the Reeds should be reversed, and the case remanded, so that 
the district court may address Royal Street's purported dedi-
cation of a portion of the property to Park City in 1979 as 
part of the Deer Valley Ski Resort access road. Royal 
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1 
Street's argument must be rejected on several grounds. 
First, there is no competent evidence in the record support-
ing Royal Street's assertion; the record reflects the asser-
tion only in unsworn statements of counsel. R. 338-39. As 
this is an appeal from summary judgment, the record is 
crucial, and Royal Street's failure to properly raise the 
issue in the record is fatal. 
In addition, Royal Street admits that the purported dedi-
cation of roadway occurred prior to the filing of its com-
plaint in 1979, R. 343, yet Royal Street failed to raise the 
question until after summary judgment had been granted. The 
district court granted summary judgment on November 19, 
1982. R. 307. On July 25, 1983, Royal Street stipulated to 
the revised property description contained in the court's 
final order without raising the question of the alleged dedi-
cation. R. 350. It was not until after it had so stipulated 
that Royal Street raised the question of dedication of the 
roadway. R. 342-44. Royal Street should not be allowed to 
overturn an adverse judgment simply by virtue of its own 
failure to timely reveal facts, arising out of its own 
actions, of which it knew or should have known even prior to
 ( 
filing its complaint. 
Even if the record were sufficient to raise the issue of 
dedication, however, that issue has no bearing on the outcome
 { 
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of the case. The adverse possession by the Reeds and their 
predecessors divested Royal Street and its predecessors of 
record title many years prior to the purported dedication. 
Even if the dedication issue remains, however, Park City was 
not an indispensible party to the quiet title action. Any 
rights Park City may have derived to the property through 
Royal Street can still be determined in a separate action. 
Under the quiet title sections of the Code, the rights of 
persons who are not made parties to a quiet title action, 
either by actual service or service by publication, are not 
affected by the judgment rendered in such action. Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-40-12 (1977). Thus, Park City remains free to 
assert any rights arising out of the purported dedication, 
and does not stand in the way of affirmance of the district 
court's judgment in favor of the Reeds. 
CONCLUSION 
The Reeds and their predecessors have exclusively occu-
pied and possessed the real property and improvements in dis-
pute in this matter since the 1920s. The property has been 
substantially enclosed and the Reeds have expended substan-
tial money and effort on its cultivation and improvement. 
Royal Street's only claim to the property is its payment of 
the $5.00 per acre annual tax on the mining claim underlying 
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the property, which encompasses less than two-thirds of an 
acre. Since approximately 1928f the property has been used 
for residential purposes by other than its record owners 
without anyone questioning or disputing the Reeds1 or their 
predecessors' right to do so. Royal Street and its predeces-
sors remained unaware of the extensive, open and notorious 
use of the property for over fifty years. 
Under such circumstances, the Utah Constitution and taxa-
tion statutes require that the surface of the property be 
separately assessed to reflect its non-mining residential 
use. As this was not done, no lawful taxes, other than taxes 
paid by the Reeds and their predecessors, were assessed 
against the surface of the subject property. The $5.00 mini-
mum tax paid by Royal Street and its predecessors under the 
statute covered only the mineral rights during that period, 
and the only taxes assessed against the surface of the prop-
erty were paid by the Reeds and their predecessors. The 
Reeds have thus satisfied the requirements for adverse pos-
session under Utah law, and the district court's judgment 
quieting title in them must be upheld. 
In addition, Royal Street's action is barred by the seven 
year statute of limitations. The statute, read in context 
with related statutes, clearly indicates an intention that it 
apply to record owners of property. While Royal Street's 
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record ownership entitles it to a presumption of possession, 
that presumption was rebutted in the instant case by unchal-
lenged facts which clearly demonstrate that the Reeds and 
their predecessors have openly and actually possessed the 
property without interference for over fifty years preceding 
Royal Street's initiation of this action. 
DATED this /U day of March, 1984. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEiq & MARTINEAU 
By 
Joseph Noyaw, of Counsel 
Stephen Roth 
Rodney R. Parker 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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